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2 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:  D/DCI/NI

FROM:  A/NIO/EAP

SUBJECT: Comments on Revised Korea Withdrawal Paper

1. A quick CIA/ORPA review of the modified paper reveals substantial analytic disagreement with the treatment of the USSR and PRC in paragraphs 10 and 11.

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-- The reasoning of paragraph 10 is contradicted by both recent history and Soviet motivation:

- Throughout the Vietnamese-US conflict, from 1965-1975, the Soviets and Chinese did work in parallel to support Hanoi against the US. But this war effort itself became an additional object of Sino-Soviet controversy -- there were bitter polemics over accurate Soviet charges that the Chinese were sporadically impeding the passage of Soviet weapons through China to Vietnam.
- It was precisely through this period of parallel support from Hanoi, from 1965 on, that the powerful Soviet buildup along the Chinese border occurred.
- In the event of a new Korean war, the long-existing Soviet anxieties about China which caused the buildup will not go away. Chinese claims to certain key Soviet territory -- particularly the strategic island opposite Khabarovsk -- will continue to threaten the Trans-Siberian railroad. The Soviets will continue to have good reason to keep a force opposite China sufficient to overcome the Chinese and respond adequately to any provocation. The Soviet supply line to the Far East will continue to be long, thin, and vulnerable, requiring a very large force in place. And the money the Soviets have

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already spent -- the concrete they have poured to build defenses along the border and in Mongolia -- will provide additional incentive not to abandon or thin out those defenses.

- Finally, even if there were no Sino-Soviet enmity, paragraph 10 presupposes the Soviets pulling forces already in place at the end of a long supply line, away from a new theater of hostilities in which they would be supporting Korea against the US. This seems unlikely. The Soviets would in this case surely be intent upon strengthening their military position in the Far East against the new dangers associated with such a war, not with weakening it.

- We believe the treatment of the Chinese viewpoint in paragraph 11 to be greatly exaggerated. The Chinese have always recognized that they cannot match Soviet sea and air power. But they also see the maintenance of US air and naval power in the region as providing a continuing US security commitment to South Korea and Japan. In any case, the Chinese see a world-wide value in a US connection not limited by the amount of military force the US is willing or able to project in Northeast Asia.

2. Because of the extent of the changes, we would have to hold representatives' meetings in order to obtain community coordination. Because of the nature of the changes - particularly in the USSR/PRC treatment - I would expect dissents from CIA and DIA.



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